

**Main Committee Two: Statement on Thematic Discussion of Safeguards**

Thank you Chair.

As Canada noted in its initial statement to this Committee earlier this week, the present and future of the NPT relies on the effective functioning of the IAEA safeguards system. Canada strongly believes that this Conference must recognize the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in verifying compliance with non-proliferation obligations through safeguards and call for the universal application of IAEA safeguards in accordance with Article III of the Treaty.

It is our belief that the Conference should recognize the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol as the de facto verification standard pursuant to Article III and that the AP is a long-standing and integral part of the IAEA Safeguards System. These instruments together provide the most effective framework for enabling the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of States' nuclear declarations and thereby provide assurances of the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapons states, including the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

It is our firm view that this Conference must urge states that have not yet done so to bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol without further delay. We also believe that the Conference should call on implicated States to rescind or amend unmodified Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs) as soon as possible.

Canada firmly believes that the Conference must advance language which urges States to cooperate fully and proactively with the IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements in order to enable the Agency to draw safeguards conclusions regarding correctness and completeness. It is also imperative that the Conference call on states in non-compliance with NPT safeguards obligations to remedy non-compliance without delay and raise the importance of IAEA inspectors being able to discharge their duties without fear or intimidation.

We believe that the conference should be ready to welcome the continued evolution of both effective and efficient safeguards and to underscore support for progress made by the IAEA to develop and implement State-level safeguards approaches.

Canada would like to draw the Committee's attention to Working Paper 10 of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and, in particular, Section 9 (Paragraphs 43 to 52) which includes specific language proposals on these critical safeguards issues. We also draw the Committee's attention to Working Paper 3 of the Vienna Group of Ten which includes relevant proposals on compliance and verification issues in paragraphs 15 to 26. We fully support the inclusion of this language in a draft outcome document for this Conference.

Thank you Chair.