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STATEMENT OF HUNGARY

by

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on Cluster 1 – Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. Chairman,

As this is the first time I take the floor, please let me congratulate you upon your chairmanship of the First Committee and assure you of my delegation's full support. Hungary aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, therefore, I would only like to make a few remarks from our national perspective.

As we have stated in our General Statement, Hungary considers the NPT not only the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime but also the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI. It was our strong hope that the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be able to adopt a comprehensive final outcome document. Although we did have very complex and substantive discussions, we unfortunately were not able to reach consensus in the end. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to do our best to make the next NPT review cycle, which starts already next year, a success and to preserve and strengthen the relevance and integrity of the NPT. To do so, we need to concentrate on issues that unite us and not on the divisive ones in all the three equally important and mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.

Hungary shares the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and does its utmost to that end. However, in our view, this goal can only be achieved if our respective efforts contribute to the creation of a safer and more secure world. In this regard we welcome that the United States and the Russian Federation extended the New START Treaty for an additional five years and that at the beginning of this year the five Nuclear Weapons States reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We hope that rather sooner than later the United States and the Russian Federation can resume their Strategic Stability Talks and those talks will lead to new arms control agreements.

Unfortunately, due to the military conflict in Ukraine the risk of nuclear weapons being used is higher than ever at any time since the height of the Cold War. The already rather complex and challenging security environment deteriorated further. Nevertheless, the fact that the current conditions are not conducive for it does not mean that nuclear disarmament – and disarmament in general – is not as relevant as ever. On the contrary, we have to unite and redouble our efforts to bring forward this noble cause by making tangible progress

However, there is no “fast track” in this area, in order to achieve tangible results we need to pursue a progressive and inclusive incremental approach consisting of gradual and concrete building blocks and engaging Nuclear Weapon States. To do so we need to focus on those pragmatic “Stepping Stones” that unite us and not on the divisive issues.

Mr. Chairman,

One of those steps is the long overdue entry into force of the CTBT, which should be a high priority for all of us, because there can be no meaningful nuclear disarmament without a comprehensive and total ban of nuclear testing. The effectiveness of the CTBTO monitoring system, which is constantly strengthened, is unanimously acknowledged. Therefore, the CTBT

is more relevant and its entry into force is more needed than ever. Thus, we attach great importance to promoting its universalization and to convincing Annex II States to join and ratify. In this respect we welcome the recent increase in the number of States Parties to the CTBT.

The next logical step towards nuclear disarmament would be a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The FMCT would not only constitute a significant contribution to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, but by limiting the amount of direct use materials, it would also contribute to the implementation of NPT Article VI obligations.

Another essential element of the incremental approach is the development of effective and reliable verification and monitoring mechanisms and instruments. We share the view that Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States should work together to create such a verification toolbox. Therefore, Hungary is honored to participate in the work of the Second Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) tasked to examine the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. We trust that the GGE will be able to reach consensus on a substantive report, enabling further work in this area. We are also actively engaged in the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), focusing on the technical aspects of and capacity building for verification.

Finally, let me underline that strategic nuclear risk reduction, transparency and confidence building are also potential areas where tangible progress can be made. While it is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, nuclear risk reduction can contribute to alleviating tensions, building confidence and enhancing trust and transparency and thus represent an important step towards nuclear disarmament.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman